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Allow me to begin my review of Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber’s new volume Darka shel
Halakha, with a few words of introduction.[1] I have the greatest respect for Prof. Sperber
both as a scholar par excellence and as a human being. Over the almost 35 years I have
been at Bar-Ilan University, we have developed a warm friendship and mutual respect. He
writes clearly and beautifully, with great knowledge, sensitivity and depth – and his book
Darka shel Halakha is no exception. Nevertheless, I am forced to disagree with his analysis
and conclusions. I strongly believe that we have to be sensitive to women’s spiritual needs
or as Hazal say: םישנל חור תחנ תושעל (Sifra, Parsheta 2; Hagiga 16b). But at the same time,
we have to be honest about what the halakha clearly states – so that, at the same time,
we will not be guilty of הרושה תא תלקלקמ הבהאה.
The question of women receiving aliyyot, which lies at the center of Darka shel Halakha,
is briefly discussed in a baraita cited in the Talmud Megilla (23a) which reads (Source 1):
(1) א דומע גכ ףד הליגמ תכסמ ילבב דומלת
ינפמ ,הרותב ארקת אל השא :םימכח ורמא לבא .השא וליפאו ןטק וליפאו ,העבש ןינמל ןילוע לכה :ןנבר ונת
רובצ דובכ.
Despite the above negative ruling of the Talmud and, in its wake, of all subsequent
codifiers,[2] within the last decade, there have been two major attempts to reopen this
issue. One was penned by R. Mendel Shapiro[3] who argues that kevod ha-tsibbur is a
social concept – and a woman’s general standing in society was lower than men’s.
Nowadays when this is no longer true, a community can be mohel on its kavod – voluntarily
set aside its honor. He errs, however, since the vast majority of rishonim and aharonim
disagree with his analysis. Kevod ha-tsibbur has nothing to do with social standing. The
vast majority of posekim  maintain that kevod ha-tsibbur stems from women’s lack of
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ha-mitsvah. The Tsniut  School  argues that women  should  not  be  at  the  center  of
communal ritual unnecessarily – and this is particularly true by keri’at haTorah, from
which they are freed. The second school maintains that there is an issue of zilzul
ha-mitsva in that the men who are duty-bound should fulfill the mitsva that is incumbent
upon them – and not delegate it to those who are not obligated.[4]
The second attempt is that of R. Prof. Daniel Sperber,[5] in Darka shel Halakha, and I
would like to focus on two major issues.
Kevod haTsibbur: Instruction or Recommendation?
Firstly, R. Sperber has suggested that the phrase in Megilla 23a “However, the Rabbis
declared: a woman should not read from the Torah – because of kevod ha-tsibbur”
describes what Hazal believed to be the preferred or recommended mode of conduct, the
ideal way of performing keri’at haTorah.
Indeed, ke-darko ba-kodesh, Prof. Sperber surveys all the places where it states ורמא לבא
םימכח and shows that some cases are merely expressions of the ideal, while others refer to
things that are actually assur. Yet, he concludes [Note 19, p. 21] that that in the case of
women’s aliyyot: "יואר וניאש אלא ל"זח תנקתב ... רבודמש הארנ אל"
This position is very problematic, particularly in this case of women’s aliyyot which is one
of kevod ha-tsibbur.
(1) Firstly, Meiri, Kiryat Sefer, Ma’amar 5, sec. a, writes (Source 2):
(2) א קלח ישימח רמאמ ,רפס תירק ,יריאמ
רובצ דובכ ינפמ השאב וחימש אלא ,…ןטקו השא וליפא 'ז ןינמל ןילוע לכהש... דמל תאצמנ...
The word “וחימ” appears many times in the Mishnaic and Tamudic literature and it refers
to strongly verbalized objection and public reproof. See for example, Source 3.
(3) ח הנשמ ד קרפ םיחספ תכסמ
םדיב וחימ אל השלש לעו םדיב וחימ השלש לע וחירי ישנא ושע םירבד השש :הנשמ
וחימ אל - םינושארה םהו - םהמ השלש לעש אלא ,םימכח ןוצרב אלש ויה םלוכ םירבד הששה ולא :ם"במר
םדיב וחימ הנורחאב םייונמה השלשו ,םימכח םדיב.
Clearly, from the Meiri’s perspective, the statement םימכח ורמא לבא by women’s aliyyot is
not a simple recommendation.
(2) Secondly, there is a group of rishonim and aharonim who maintain that in the specific
case of women’s aliyyot, women cannot receive aliyyot, even in cases of she’at ha-dehak
or be-diavad. This school includes the Rambam and Semag and many subsequent aharonim
(R. Abraham Pinso; R. Matsli’ah Mazuz; R. Ben-Zion Lichtman, R. Zalman Nehemiah
Goldberg and R. Isaac Zilberstein). For example, Rambam (Sources 4 and 5) writes without
any qualification that women may not receive aliyyot:
(4) זי הכלה ,בי קרפ םיפכ תאישנו הליפת תוכלה ם"במר
…רוביצה דובכ ינפמ רוביצב ארקת אל השא
) 5 םש חקור השעמ ,חקור יח דועסמ ברה (
ירמגל רסאנ כ"א ,"רוביצה דובכ ינפמ ארקת אל השא"-ד ןידה רוציק בתכ וניברו…
Semag (Source 6) records that minors may receive aliyyot, but makes no mention of
women whatsoever. On the contrary, he maintains (Sources 7 and 8) that women cannot
motsi men in megilla, even be-di-avad, just as they can’t receive aliyyot.
(6) טי ןמיס ןישע ,(ג"מס) לודג תווצמ רפס ,יצוקמ בקעי ןב השמ ברה
.ןיינמל העבשב הלוע םיכרבמ ימל עדויו תורקל עדויה ןטקו .. העבש תירחשב תבשב ,םיארוקה [םה] המכ
) 7 הליגמ תוכלה ,ןנברדמ תווצמ – לודג תווצמ רפס (
קרפב ןנירמאד הכונח רנ ינבישת לאו .םירכזה תא תואיצומ ןניא הליגמ ארקמב תובייח םישנד בג לע ףאד…
תאירק ומכ אוהש הליגמ ארקמ ינאשד .שיאה איצוהל ףא עמשמ תקלדמ השאד (א ,גכ תבש) ןיקילדמ המב
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ך
) 8 ה ק"ס טפרת ןמיס םהרבא ןגמ (
" םישנאה תא תואיצומ םניא םישנהש א"יו"
דובכ ינפמ הלוספו 'יפ (ג"מס) הרותה תאירק ומכ יוהד הליגמ ינאשד הכונח תורנל ד"לו - תואיצומ םניא
ם"אר) גולפ אלד האיצומ ןיא דיחיל 'יפא ןכלו רובצה)
Clearly, according to these authorities, the statement םימכח  ורמא  לבא is not a simple
recommendation.
(3) There is another very large group of posekim (perhaps the majority) led by the R. Yoel
Sirkis (Ba”h; Sources 9 and 10) who maintain that one cannot be mohel on kevod
ha-tsibbur – particularly in the case of women’s aliyyot. However, bi-she’at ha-dehak –
where there is no alternative or no one else eligible - a woman can read, lest keri’at
haTorah be cancelled. It is to such cases that the Gemara in Megilla was referring.
(9) "ןינממ ןיאו" ה"ד ג"נ ןמיס ח"וא רוט (ח"ב) שדח תיב ,סיקריס לאוי ברה
.לוחמל רוביצה דיב ןיא ,רוביצ דובכל וששחד םימכח ונקת ךכש ןויכ ,טושפ רבדה אלא…
) 10 ד"מק ןמיס םייח חרוא רוט ,שדח תיב (
רשפאש אכיה אלא הליחתמ ונקת אל רוביצה דובכ םושמ .. םימכח ונקיתש המ ...
For example, in a case of a city with only kohanim cited by Rabbi Sperber himself,
Maharam mi-Rothenburg (Source 11) permits women to receive the third through seventh
aliya. Otherwise the Torah reading would not occur, for the lineage of the kohanim would
be challenged were they to receive the remaining aliyyot. In the language of the
Maharam:
(11) חק ןמיס (גארפ סופד) ד קלח גרבנטורמ ם"רהמ ת"וש
לכהד םישנ וארקי בושו םיימעפ ארוק ןהכד יל הארנ דחא לארשי ['יפא] הב ןיאו םינהכ הלוכש ריעו...
השא ארקת אל 'ימכח ורמא לבא הלע קיסמד יהנו .(א"ע ג"כ הליגמ) ןטקו החפשו דבע 'יפא 'ז ןינמל 'ימילשמ
ינב ורמאי אלש םיארוקה םינהכ םגפ ינפמ רובצה דובכ החדי רשפא אלד אכיה ,רובצה דובכ ינפמ הרותב
תושורג.
Maharam mi-Rothenburg was only willing to permit bi-she’at ha-dehak. This certainly
doesn’t sound like a recommendation הצלמה. Rather it is permission given only bi-she’at
ha-dehak.
I t would seem to me that in Darka shel Halakha there is a blurring of the difference
between le-khathila and be-di-avad. For example, Hazal say that one should not use a
milchig spoon ומוי ןב וניאש (not used in last 24 hours) to stir hot chicken soup. Similarly,
Hazal indicate that one shouldn’t eat out of utensils that haven’t been immersed in a
mikva. In both cases, be-di-avad, the food remains perfectly kosher. Hazal’s ruling in both
these cases is not a recommendation - but rather a clear directive how one is required to
act; under normative conditions, it is assur to act otherwise. This is also true regarding
women’s  aliyyot  –  Hazal  forbade it le-khathila, even though be-di-avad  or  bi-she’at
ha-dehak the aliyya may be valid.
Now it should be appreciated that from Prof. Sperber’s perspective it is important that
םימכח ורמא לבא be only a הצלמה. Prof. Sperber wants to maintain that there really is no
“down side” to women getting aliyyot. However, to my mind, he errs – kevod ha-tsibbur is
a takana le-khathila, not a recommendation.
In this regard, I would also like to briefly mention one further crucial point, relevant to
both the papers of R. Mendel Shapiro and R. Daniel Sperber – but which we will not be
able to develop fully here at the Seforim blog.[6] When Hazal talked about women getting
aliyyot, they were referring to a system in which the oleh made the berakhot and read
aloud - for himself and the community. However, nowadays, the job of the oleh  is
bifurcated: the oleh  makes the berakhot  and  ba’al korei reads aloud. This raises a
fundamental question: how can one person make berakhot, while another does the
ma’aseh ha-mitsva. For there not to be a berakha le-vatalah there must be a mechanism
to transfer the reading from the ba’al korei to the oleh. That mechanism is either
shom’eah ke-oneh or shelihut. But both mechanisms require that both the oleh and ba’al
korei  be obligated – otherwise there is no areivut. Since women are not obligated in
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keri’at haTorah, they can serve neither as the oleh nor as the ba’al korei - me-ikkar
ha-din – because the birkhot haTorah of the oleh will be berakhot levatalah. Note that all
this has nothing to do with kevod haTsibbur. The only case in which the issue of kevod
haTsibbur begins is in the uncommon case where a woman makes the berakhot and reads
for herself.[7] Hence, under a bifurcated system, there is a clear downside in allowing
women to read or serve as olot – a proliferation of berakhot le-vatala!
Does Kevod haBeriyyot Defer Kevod haTsibbur –
The Rules of Kevod haBeriyyot 
Lets now turn to the second issue – and this is Prof. Sperber’s major hiddush in this book.
Briefly, Prof. Sperber notes that there is a concept in halakha called kevod ha-beriyyot
which refers to shame or embarrassment (ןויזב  וא  השוב) which would result from the
fulfillment of a religious obligation. The view of the halakha is that kevod ha-beriyyot can
defer rabbinic obligations and prohibitions. Hence, Prof. Sperber maintains that if there is
a community of women who are offended by their not receiving aliyyot – because of the
rabbinic rule of kevod hatsibbur, then kevod ha-beriyyot should defer kevod ha-tsibbur.
Professor Sperber’s book is devoted to describing the use of kevod ha-beriyyot in the
halakhic literature. He is by no means the first to do this and the subject is extensively
reviewed and analyzed by Rabbis Rakover,[8] Blidstein,[9] Lichtenstein,[10] Feldman,[11]
and many others.[12]
Let’s begin with the Gemara in Berakhot 19b:
(12) ב דומע טי ףד תוכרב תכסמ ילבב דומלת
המכח ןיא" (א"כ ילשמ) אמעט יאמ ,קושב וליפא ןטשופ ודגבב םיאלכ אצומה :בר רמא הדוהי בר רמא (א)
.ברל דובכ ןיקלוח ןיא םשה לולח שיש םוקמ לכ - "'ה דגנל הצע ןיאו הנובת ןיאו
ומע ןיאב - הרוהטב אב ,האמט תחאו הרוהט תחא ,םיכרד יתש םהינפלו ,ורזחו תמה תא ורבק :יביתמ (ב)
םהמע אב ,האמטב םיאב :םיסרוג םינושארה בור] .ודובכ םושמ ,האמטב ומע ןיאב - האמטב אב ,הרוהטב
ןנברד סרפה תיבב אבא יבר המגרת .'ה דגנל הנובת ןיאו המכח ןיא :אמיל ?יאמא [םדובכ םושמ
הנובת ןיאו המכח ןיא :אמיל ?יאמאו .הרותבש השעת אל [תא] החודש תוירבה דובכ לודג :עמש את...(ג)
רשא רבדה ןמ] רוסת אלד (אי ,ז"י םירבד) ואלב אנהכ ברד הימק אבש רב בר המגרת - !'ה דגנל הצע ןיאו
.ןנבר ורש ודובכ םושמו ,רוסת אלד ואל לע והניכמסא ןנברד ילימ לכ... ]לאמשו ןימי ךל ודיגי
ירקו ,תוירבה דובכ ינפמ החדנ םירפוס ירבדמ אוהש רבד :והל רמאק יכהו - 'וכו ןנברד ילימ לכ :י"שר (ד)
לע רובעל והיירקיל הולחא ןנבר ,אוה אתיירואד וכל אישק אקדו ,רוסת אל ביתכד םושמ - השעת אל היל
תוירבה דובכ אכיאד אכיה םהירבד.
The upshot of this Gemara is that if one is wearing sha’atnez – the wearer is obligated to
remove it even in the marketplace, despite any possible embarrassment. The Gemara
explains that G-d’s honor/dignity takes priority over that of Man. However, if the garment
is only rabbinically forbidden, one can wait until they return home to change. The reason
is that kevod ha-beriyyot, the honor of the individual, can defer rabbinic prohibitions.
Prof. Sperber adequately shows that kevod ha-beriyyot has always been an important
consideration in pesak. However, an in-depth survey of the responsa literature over the
past 1000 years makes it clear that it cannot be invoked indiscriminately. Indeed, as the
gedolei ha-posekim make apparent, there are clearly defined parameters which Prof.
Sperber seems to ignore. Hence, R. Sperber’s application of kevod ha-beriyyot to the issue
of women’s aliyyot is seriously flawed. In this brief presentation, we will discuss nine of
the aforementioned principles.
(1) Firstly, kevod ha-tsibbur is merely the kevod ha-beriyyot of the tsibbur.[13] Hence it
makes no sense that the honor of the individual should have priority over the honor of a
large collection of individuals. Indeed, this is explicitly stated by the 13th century Meiri.
[Source 13; Meiri is referring to Source 12[ב
) 13 :ב דומע טי ףד תוכרב ,הריחבה תיב ,יריאמ (
ןכו] ,םידיחי וא דיחי ינפמ החדנ םיבר דובכ ןיאש {ןיארנ םירבדה ןיאו .ומע ןיאב האמוטב אב םיסרוג שי}
...ברעמה דומלתב ףאו...יתבר לבאב [אוה
) 2 ) Secondly, The Meiri (Source 14) also emphatically states:
(14) :ב דומע טי ףד תוכרב ,הריחבה תיב ,יריאמ
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Giving women aliyyot  by overriding kevod ha-tsibbur with  kevod ha-beriyyot would
effectively be honoring women by dishonoring the community – and, hence, cannot be
done.
(3) R. Sperber’s suggestion would ask us to uproot completely the rabbinic ban on
women’s aliyyot. However, kevod ha-beriyyot can only temporarily set aside a rabbinic
ordinance. As stated in the Jerusalem Talmud (Source 15):
(15) א"ע בל ,א"ה ט"פ םיאלכ ימלשורי דומלת
;רוסא רמא דח :(רבדב םיקלוח םיארומא ינש) ןיארומא ןירת ,םיאלכ שובל אצמנו קושב ךלהמ היהש ירה
לודג :אריעז יבר רמאד איההכ - רתומ רמאד ןאמ ;הרות רבד - רוסא רמאד ןאמ .רתומ רמא (רחאו) הנרחו
תחא העש השעת אלב הוצמה תא החוד אוהש םיברה דובכ.
Many of the commentaries on the Yerushlami and posekim hold that this proviso of sha’ah
ahat applies to Rabbinic mitsvot as well – including: Tosafot, Ketubot 103b, end of s.v.
“Oto”; Or Zarua, Hilkhot Erev Shabbat, sec. 6; Penei Moshe; Vilna Gaon; R. David Pardo;
Arukh haShulhan (Source 16); and others.
(16) :ב ףיעס ,ג"ש ןמיס ד"וי ,ןחלושה ךורע
ל"נ ידימת ןנברד רוסיאב 'יפאו.. .טושפיו ול ודיגי ותיבל אבישכד ,הלק העשל אוהד [םיאלכב] אכה ינאש
תוירבה דובכ דצמ עונמל ןיאו ,ול דיגהל בייוחמד
) 4 ) Next, many posekim including R. Yair Hayyim Bachrach, R. Meir Simha of Dvinsk
(Source 17), R. Jeroham Perlow, R. Moses Feinstein, R. Chaim Zev Reines indicate that the
“dishonor” that is engendered must result from an act of disgrace - not from refraining to
give honor. As Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk writes:
(17) ד"י הכלה ,ו קרפ ט"וי תוכלה (קסניוודמ ןהכה החמש ריאמ ברה) חמש רוא
ירש ימ...דובכ לש ןינע...לבא ,תוירבל אוה אנויזבד ידימב אקווד הז...תוירבה דובכ לודג?
Only in cases where kavod is obligatory (e.g., for a King or mourner) is the absence of
kavod considered embarrassing, as indicated by R. Isaac Blazer (Source 18),
(18) (רזלב קחצי ברה) דנ ,קחצי ירפ ת"וש
דובכ רדעהד ,תוירבה דובכ ללכב אוה דובכ רדעה םג בייוחמ דובכהש םוקמב ארמגל והל אריבסד רמול ךירצ
שארב בשוי לבאש ןיינמ (טס ףד) תובותכב ןייעו ...יאנג ומכ אוה....
Prof. Yaakov Blidstein discusses burial on Yom Tov sheini shel galuyot, which is permitted
because  Yom Tov sheni is  de-rabbanan, while not burying is kevod ha-beriyyot.[14]
However, a long list of posekim will not permit 20 individuals to violate Yom Tov sheni to
attend to a burial, when only 10 are required to bury the deceased and the additional 10
would be coming along out of honor. Only the first 10 are permitted.
Similarly, in the case of aliyyot, no act of shame has been performed to all those not
called to the Torah (both men and women); they are simply not honored. Kevod
ha-beriyyot cannot be activated under such conditions.
R. Daniel Sperber in his book Darka shel Halakha (p. 77, note 104) attempts to challenge
this principle - that kevod ha-beriyyot is inapplicable when no act of shame has been
performed. He cites the fact that a bride is permitted to wash her face on Yom Kippur
(Source 19).
(19) א הנשמ ח קרפ אמוי תכסמ
הלכהו ךלמהו הטמה שימשתבו לדנסה תליענבו הכיסבו הציחרבו היתשבו הליכאב רוסא םירופכה םוי :הנשמ
:ןירסוא םימכחו רזעילא יבר ירבד לדנסה תא לוענת היחהו םהינפ תא וצחרי
.הלכ היורק איה התפוחל םוי םישלש לכו ,הלעב לע בבחתש דע יונ הכירצ - הלכהו ישר
הלכ היורק םוי םישלש לכו .הלעב לע הבבחל ידכ יונ הכירצ - הלכהו :ארונטרבמ הידבוע 'ר:
R. Sperber assumes that the prohibition against washing on Yom Kippur is rabbinic (when
many authorities hold it is biblical) and that the permission to wash stems from kevod
ha-beriyyot. Based on this, he wants to demonstrate that the shame here results from
something that was not done.
This analysis is in error because the leniency for a bride has nothing to do with kevodthe Seforim blog: Aryeh A. Frimer Review of Daniel Sperber’s Darka ... http://seforim.blogspot.com/2008/06/aryeh-frimer-review-of-daniel-sp...
6 von 10 11.08.2008 16:16
This analysis is in error because the leniency for a bride has nothing to do with kevod
ha-beriyyot. What was forbidden was rehitsa shel ta’anug, but not washing of necessity,
e.g., for cleanliness. A bride is permitted to wash her face on Yom Kippur, so that her
face would not be displeasing in her new grooms eyes – and this is considered laving of
necessity. As Rashi and Rav write (Source 19 above), a bride requires beauty.
R. Sperber (p. 83) further cites a responsum of R. Isaiah of Trani, Resp. haRid, sec. 21
which permits the lighting of candles in the synagogue on Yom Tov because of “kevod
ha-beriyyot.” R. Sperber attempts to use this example to demonstrate that kevod
ha-beriyyot can set aside prohibitions even if it is only to honor those who are attending
synagogue.
Unfortunately, he errs in his analysis here as well. Similar teshuvot are found from the
Rid, Rosh and Maharam of Rothenburg.[15] And their goal is to show that lighting candles
in the synagogue come under the rubric of tsorekh okhel nefesh because they honor
people (Rid), the synagogue (Maharam) or the holiday (Rosh). Once it its tsorekh okhel
nefesh, it is the tsorekh okhel nefesh which defers the prohibition.
(5) Nearly all authorities – including, inter alia, R. Naftali Amsterdam (Source 20), R.
Elhanan Bunim Wasserman, R. Makiel Tsvi haLevi Tannenbaum, Rav Yitzchak Nissim
(Source 21), R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, R. Elijah Bakshi Doron (Source 22), R. Israel
Shepansky - maintain that kevod ha-beriyyot requires an objective standard that affects
or is appreciated by all.
(20) גנ ,קחצי ירפ ת"וש
הזיאמ היהי ישונאה ןימ לכל יאנג אוהש רבד לע קר רמאנ אל תוירבה דובכ הנה יכ :םדרטשמא ילתפנ ברה
קר סחייתמ ןויזבהש רבדב לבא .הזמ םישייבתמ םדאה ינב בורש םורע ךליל וא הוצמ תמ ומכ ,היהיש ןימ
.תוירבה דובכ םעטמ רוטפל ללכ ךייש אל הזב ,הפוק וא קש אשיל ומכ ,ותנוכת יפל הזה םדאל
) 21 (םיסינ ברה די) ד"כשת ןושחרמ ,די בתכ הבושת ,םיסינ קחצי ברה (
ןיאש איה תשרופמ הכלה .הרותל תולעל אל לבא ,ללפתהל תסנכה תיבל ןכ ינפל [הווצמ תבה] ךלתש ןבומכו
.םדא ינב לש תושגרה יפל הכלהה תא םינשמ ןיאו ,רוביצב הרותב תארוק השא
) 22 'ג תוא ,ה"נ ןמיס ,ב"ח ,בא ןינב ת"וש ,ןורוד ישקב והילא ברה (
יטרפ םדא לבא ...לבאה ודבכיש תוירבה דובכ הז ןוגכבו ,םילבאה לכ דבכל שיש אוה ןיד לבאה דובכ...
ןנברד רוסיא תוחדל וא ,ותוא רוטפל לוכי וניא םייטרפ םילוקישמ ודובכ...ומצע תא דבכל טילחמש.
This view explicitly rejects subjective standards - in which what is embarrassing results
from the idiosyncrasies or hypersensitivities of an individual or small group. The vast
majority of religiously committed women are not offended when they do not receive an
aliyya. Indeed, they understand and accept the halakhic given, although some might
clearly have preferred it to be otherwise.
More importantly, does it make halakhic sense that if a group of women – nay, any group,
says: “this Rabbinic halakha offends me” – be it mehitsa, tsni’ut, kashrut, stam yeynam,
many aspects of taharat ha-mishpahah, who counts for a minyan, and who can serve as a
hazzan - then we should have a carte blanche to go about abrogating it. Such a position is
untenable, if not unthinkable.[16]
(6) Many leading scholars[17] emphasize that, as in the cases of kevod ha-beriyyot
discussed in Berakhot 19b and elsewhere, the shame must result from extraneous factors.
Thus, removing the kilayyim garment per se’ is not what causes the shame. Rather, it is
that one has no other garment underneath and, hence, remains naked. In such cases,
kevod ha-beriyyot can be invoked to nullify the rabbinic commandment which leads to the
dishonor. However, kevod ha-beroyyot cannot be invoked to nullify a rabbinic
commandment, where the shame comes from the very fulfillment of the rabbinic
injunction itself.
Take for example one who is invited to dine with his colleagues or clients, would we allow
him to avoid embarrassment by eating fruit and vegetables from which terumot and
ma’asrot (which nowadays is Rabbinic) have not been removed, or by consuming hamets
she-avar alav haPesah, or by drinking stam yeynam (wine touched or poured by a
non-Jew). Or alternatively, suppose someone is at a meeting and is ashamed to walk out
in order to daven Minha. And what about prayers at the airport in between flights. Would
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we allow him to forgo his rabbinic prayer obligation because of this embarrassment?
The answer is that in those cases where acting according to halakha - be it to not eat
terumot and ma’asrot, or to not drink stam yeynam, or to fulfill ones prayer obligation –
creates the embarrassment, then kevod ha-beriyyot cannot set aside the Rabbinic
prohibition. One should be proud to be fulfilling the halakha. Similarly, kevod ha-beriyyot
cannot be invoked to uproot the rabbinic consideration of kevod ha-tsibbur which
prevents women’s aliyyot. This is because the dishonor stems directly from the very fact
that women are not given aliyyot in accordance with the rabbinic guidelines.
(7) That the rabbis of the Talmud were sensitive to women’s spiritual needs is evident
from the rabbinic concept of nahat ru’ah (spiritual satisfaction), which was invoked in a
variety of instances to permit certain special dispensations for women.[18] R. Sperber
maintains that this concept is an expression of kevod ha-beriyyot.[19] Yet, despite this
admitted sensitivity, Hazal themselves were not concerned about kevod ha-beriyyot when
they ruled that, because of kevod ha-tsibbur, women should not le-khathila receive
aliyyot. Hence, how can we?
This argument is all the more true according to the explanation of Rashi on the mechanism
of kevod ha-beriyyot deferments. Rashi (Source 12ד cited above) explains that in instances
of kevod ha-beriyyot the Rabbis “forgo their honor to allow their edict to be violated.”
(12) ב דומע טי ףד תוכרב תכסמ ילבב דומלת
.ןנבר ורש ודובכ םושמו ,רוסת אלד ואל לע והניכמסא ןנברד ילימ לכ .....
היל ירקו ,תוירבה דובכ ינפמ החדנ םירפוס ירבדמ אוהש רבד :והל רמאק יכהו - 'וכו ןנברד ילימ לכ י"שר (ד)
םהירבד לע רובעל והיירקיל הולחא ןנבר ,אוה אתיירואד וכל אישק אקדו ,רוסת אל ביתכד םושמ - השעת אל
תוירבה דובכ אכיאד אכיה.
It is one thing if the clash is unexpected, unanticipated and accidental. But in the case of
keri’at haTorah, it was Hazal themselves who knowingly set up the rule of kevod
ha-tsibbur which precludes women from aliyyot. Why would we expect them to forgo
their honor in such a case?
(8) The Rivash (Resp. Rivash, sec 226) forbade sewing baby clothes during hol ha-moed for
a newborn’s circumcision despite the parents’ desire to dress him properly and festively
for the event. One of Rivash’s rationales is that since all understand that new clothes
cannot be sewn on hol ha-moed - because Hazal forbade it, kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be
invoked to circumvent this rabbinic prohibition. Similarly, one cannot invoke kevod
ha-beriyyot to allow women to receive aliyyot, because all understand that this has been
synagogue procedure for two millennia and that the Rabbis of the Talmud themselves
prohibited it.
(9) Rivash (ibid.) and Havot Yair (sec. 95) and others rule against extending the leniency of
kevod ha-beriyyot beyond those instances explicitly discussed by Hazal - honor of the
deceased (תמה  דובכ), personal hygiene dealing with excrement, undress, and the
wholeness of the family unit. New cases may not be comparable in their nature or severity
to the original examples. Indeed, as noted by Prof. Blidstein and R. Aharon
Lichtenstein,[20] throughout the two millennia of post-Talmudic responsa literature,
kevod ha-beriyyot is rarely if ever cited as the sole or even major grounds for overriding a
bona fide rabbinic ordinance. It always appears as one of many additional reasons to be
lenient (snif le-hakel). This is indeed the case in nearly all the instances cited at length by
R. Daniel Sperber in his book Darka shel Halakha.
What’s more, in those instances where kevod ha-beriyyot is invoked essentially alone, it is
because the matter being deferred is a mere, often unbased, stringency (humra be-alma).
For example, the custom in some communities prohibiting menstruants to enter the
synagogue – which Prof. Sperber has returned to repeatedly (Sperber, pp. 74) - is what the
posekim call a humra ve-silsul be-alma. Hence, the fact that even in such stringent
communities, menstruants visited the sanctuary on the High Holidays - would be a classic
example of kevod ha-beriyyot overruling a humra be-alma.
Now Prof. Sperber will respond, that he too would only invoke kevod ha-beriyyot in the
case of women’s aliyyot. After all, there is no real down side - at most we have only
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not a recommendation by women’s aliyyot - but a prohibition le-khathilla. What’s more, a
woman who gets an aliyya without reading for herself or who is only the ba’alat keria is
responsible for generating berakhot levatala. We have also argued that Prof. Sperber has
improperly invoked kevod ha-beriyyot for the case of women’s aliyyot because he has not
taken into consideration the kelalim of the gedolei ha-posekim.
I would like to close with one last point. Despite the fact that we strongly disagree with
Prof. Sperber’s conclusion, he after all did what a Torah scholar is bidden to do. He made
a creative suggestion, documented his arguments, published his suggestion in the rabbinic
literature for all to examine, and awaits criticism or approval. After thrashing out the
issue, back and forth - one hopefully will be able to discern where the truth lies.[21]
However, we take issue with those who would enact women’s aliyyot in practice, hastily
undoing more than two millennia of halakhic precedent - simply because an article or two
has appeared on the subject. Considering the novelty of this innovation, religious integrity
and sensitivity requires serious consultation with renowned halakhic authorities of
recognized stature - prior to acting on such a significant departure from normative
halakha. It often takes several years time before a final determination can be reached as
to whether or not a suggested innovation meets these standards. But that cannot provide
adequate justification for haste.
The halakhic process has always been about the honest search for truth – Divine truth.[22]
To adopt one particular approach - simply because it yields the desired result, lacks
intellectual honesty and religious integrity. It is equivalent to shooting the arrows and
then drawing the bull’s-eye. To paraphrase Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz: we must always
ask ourselves whether we are in reality serving the Divine will or our own.[23]
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